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Abstract
This paper considers patent granting as a two-tiered process, which consists of
patent office examination (public enforcement) and court challenges (private enforce-
ment). It argues that, when the patent-holder has private information about the patent
validity, (i) a weak patent is more likely to be settled and thus escape court challenges
than a strong patent; and (ii) when the economy suffers from the low patent quality
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may strengthen private scrutiny
over a weak patent. Both work against Lemley (2001)’s hypothesis of a “rationally
ignorant” patent office.
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1 Introduction
Patent quality, defined as the extent to which issued patents conform to patent law
requirements,1 has been one of the dominant concerns about the “broken” United
States patent system over the past 10-15 years (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). The flood of
weak patents, i.e., those patents don’t deserve patent protection, is accused of damaging
innovation (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004, Bessen and Meurer, 2008) and hampering post-
innovation market efficiency (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Dissatisfaction and cautions
have been raised by industry stake-holders, academic commentators, and government
agencies such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (FTC, 2003). In response, the U.S. Congress has initiated a
series of legislation efforts beginning in 2005; the most recent bills proposed to reform
the U.S. patent system were introduced in March 2009.2
When identifying the source of the problem, there is a consensus that the current
“crisis” is largely attributable to lax quality control in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (hereafter, USPTO). However, when talking about reform, disproportional at-
tention seems to be shifted away from the patent office. For instance, recent reform bills
remain silent on how to improve the performance of the USPTO. This “ignorance” on
the part of the patent office might be based on a good reason. As suggested by Lemley
(2001)’s influential “rational ignorance” argument, the patent office may optimally set
its examination standard at a not-so-high level, even though quite a few patents with
questionable quality would be issued.
Lemley (2001)’s “rational ignorance” hypothesis is based on two premises. First,
the patent granting decision is in fact structured as a two-tiered process. Besides the
inspection by patent office examiners (the public enforcement tier), private parties can
also challenge the validity of issued patents in court or at the patent office (the private
enforcement tier).3 And second, private challengers have considerable advantages over
1In most jurisdictions, a patent is granted to an invention that is novel, non-obvious (or contains an
inventive step), and useful (or has industrial applications). The first two are technological criteria, i.e., the
comparison is made between the invention and existing technologies. The usefulness criterion, in practice,
is also determined by whether the invention has any applications, but not whether it is profitable in the
market.
2The major sponsors are Senators Orrin Hatch, Patrick Leahy (S. 515), and Jon Kyl (S. 610) in the
Senat; and Representative John Conyers (H.R. 1260) in the House. On April 2, 2009, the Senate Judiciary
Committee approved to bring S. 515 to the full Senate. These bills closely follow earlier proposed legislation
including the Patent Reform Act of 2007 and the Patent Reform Act of 2005.
3The post-grant challenge procedures within the patent office are called patent reexamination in the U.S.,
and patent opposition in Europe, respectively.
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the public agency in the process. They have more knowledge about which patents
cover valuable inventions, so the granted monopoly entails serious consequences; they
also closely follow technological developments and have more information about where
to locate those prior arts crucial to patentability evaluations. Under these two pre-
sumptions, Lemley (2001) argues that, instead of carefully scrutinizing every patent
application at the patent office, it would be more efficient to lower the examination
standard and issue some patents with questionable quality, while letting private par-
ties select which patents to dispute in detail in court. A glance at recent legislation
proposals also reveals this emphasis on the private sector to eliminate weak patents.4
In this paper, we accept the two premises. Nevertheless, we argue that to embrace
this hypothesis for policy guidance, at least two questions have to be addressed: How
reliable is private enforcement in improving the patent quality? And how would public
enforcement affect private behavior? More specifically, we consider whether and when
a private challenger would initiate a validity challenge against the “right target,” i.e.,
weak patents, rather than settle the case; and whether better patent office performance
would strengthen or weaken private incentives to litigate and weed out weak patents.
To answer the two questions, we consider a bargaining game between a patent-
holder/inventor and a private challenger: Before launching a validity challenge, a
patent-holder and a potential challenger engage in pre-trial settlement bargaining, and
this bargaining is clouded with asymmetric information. The key to our analysis is
the well-known case selection effect in the law and economics literature, namely, the
systematic difference between those settled and unsettled disputes. In Section 2, we
introduce a simple two-type model where the patent-holder has private information
about her patent being a strong or weak type, and the challenger optimally chooses
the litigation efforts exercised in court should bargaining break down. A strong patent
is assumed to be possessed by a true inventor. By contrast, the owner of a weak patent
tries to game the system and patent technologies in the public domain.
In Section 3 we show that bargaining breakdown is more likely to happen and
a challenge ensue when the dispute involves a strong patent, for its owner will be
“tougher” at the bargaining table. For the same level of litigation efforts, a strong
patent is more likely to withstand a challenge than a weak patent. Private force, then,
4For instance, the 2009 version of proposed reform follows its previous versions to include a post-grant
review procedure and the possibility for third parties to submit documents relevant to the examination of
a patent application. The latter is similar to a pre-grant challenge procedure that we shall consider in
Appendix B.
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may be exerted toward the wrong target, and the true inventor may face a higher
litigation risk than the opportunistic player.
Even when the weak patent can be eliminated by private challenges, it doesn’t
necessarily imply that we can rely on private force to such an extent that the patent
office could “delegate” the task to private players while reducing or maintaining low
examination standards. In Section 4, we show that public and private enforcement
may exhibit a non-monotonic relationship. When patent quality is sufficiently high, a
better-functioning patent office may crowd out private incentives to strike down the
weak patent. However, when patent quality is sufficiently low, a greater effort at the
patent office may increase the chance of eliminating the weak patent in court. In
this case, strengthening the patent office’s performance creates a multiplying effect by
enlisting more private force against the weak patent. Together with the case selection
pattern, these results cast doubts on the “rational ignorance” hypothesis and caution
the danger of maintaining a “weak” patent office. Put differently, we provide a raison-
d’eˆtre for the patent office, and refute the idea of abolishing patent office examination
and moving toward a patent registration system.5
A caveat is in order: Our analysis shows how the patent office performance should
be adjusted in order to increase patent quality, but does not address the issue of the
optimal patent quality. That is, we do not perform a full-fledged welfare analysis to pin
down the optimal patent quality and the corresponding examination effort exerted by
the patent office. Doing so would require the construction of a social welfare function
as a function of patent quality, which in turn demands further details such as the static
deadweight loss associated with the patent rights, the dynamic incentives the patent
could generate, and the cost disadvantage of the patent office vis-a`-vis the private
challenger, etc.. Nevertheless, our results directly apply whenever low patent quality is
a dominant policy concern. For instance, when the social loss due to weak patents far
outweighs the additional expenditure or the cost of other policy measures to enhance
the performance of the patent office, then raising patent quality becomes the major
policy objective.
We conclude the paper in Section 5 with a discussion of future research. All proofs
are relegated to Appendix A. In Appendix B we consider the effect of a pre-grant
challenge system. (Appendix C, not for publication, provides robustness checks of our
main results in alternative settings.)
5See Merges (1999).
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 Related literature: Recent concerns about patent quality have spurred reform
proposals from different sources.6 These proposals cover a wide range of issues, but
often lack formal analysis. One reason, perhaps, is that relative to the optimal design
in terms of patent length, scope, and other policy instruments, only recently have
scholars started the theoretical efforts toward patent examination, or more generally
the implementation of the patent system. Kesan and Gallo (2006) describes how weak
patents can be settled in a symmetric information environment with legal expenses.
Other papers, such as Langinier and Marcoul (2008), Caillaud and Ducheˆne (2009),
Prady (2008), and Schuett (2009) elaborate on the strategic interaction between patent
applicants and the patent office. Unlike these papers, we emphasize the “second eye,”
that is, the role of private enforcement, and consider the cooperation between public
and private sectors to improve patent quality. In this aspect, Koenen (2009) adopts
a similar framework as our paper, but explores different private strategies. While we
allow for a private challenger to adjust his litigation efforts in court, Koenen (2009)
excludes this decision but instead lets the challenger choose whether to invalidate the
patent or simply infringe and enter the market.
There is extensive discussion in the law and economics literature about the divi-
sion of labor between public and private enforcement, both in a general framework
(Shavell, 1993) and in specific fields such as antitrust law (Segal and Whinston, 2006,
Bourjade et al., 2009). In particular, Briggs et al. (1996) and Bourjade et al. (2009)
also incorporate case selection into antitrust enforcement.7 In fact, in a two-stage
enforcement structure, Briggs et al. (1996) analyzes case selection in both public and
private enforcement. That is, they allow the public antitrust agency to settle the case,
a common practice in the antitrust context, and stress how the occurrence or disap-
pearance of a subsequent private (treble damage) suit would affect settlement behavior
at the public enforcement stage.8 By contrast, we do not permit the patent office to
“settle” with a patent applicant, and focus more on how public enforcement will affect
private enforcement. Bourjade et al. (2009), similar to our analysis, raises the case se-
6E.g., FTC (2003), NAS (2004). Also see the special issue of Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2004, 19
(3).
7McAfee et al. (2008) points out another strategic element and argues that a private firm may abuse the
court avenue and initiate an antitrust lawsuit against its competitor even when the latter doesn’t commit
any anti-competition action.
8In Briggs et al. (1996), public enforcement may fully crowd out private enforcement. Due to a fixed
litigation cost the private plaintiff may lose the credibility to sue after the government action, despite the
defendant’s private information. In our model, private litigation disappears only when there is symmetric
information between the two private parties and thus no bargaining friction.
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lection pattern as a limit of private enforcement, but then moves on to discuss whether
and how to facilitate private litigation by adjusting damage rewards or litigation cost;
there is no public enforcement in their framework.
More importantly, both Briggs et al. (1996) and Bourjade et al. (2009) adopt an
assumption of what we call “exogenous litigation outcome.” That is, once settlement
bargaining breaks down and the lawsuit reaches the court (possibly after paying a fixed
litigation expenditure), the disputing parties have no further influence over the litiga-
tion outcome. In this paper, we relax this assumption and let the private challenger
(who tries to invalidate the patent in court) make an optimal litigation expenditure
or effort decision, which will in turn affect the chances of striking down the patent.
This “endogenous litigation outcome” scenario differentiates our model from the ma-
jority of previous case selection studies based on asymmetric information (Spier (2005)
and Daughtey and Reinganum (2008) are two excellent review of this literature).9 Al-
though studies such as Katz (1988) have examined litigants’ optimal legal expenditure
decisions in court, these models often start directly with litigation and ignore set-
tlement; and most case selection literature have overlooked the expenditure decision
in court. Two exceptions are Franzoni (1999) and Friedman and Wickelgren (2008).10
These two papers focus on different issues and adopt the screening paradigm of Bebchuk
(1984), where the uninformed party makes the settlement party.11 Our signaling model
9In the literature, case selection has been extensively studied under two prominent approaches, that
of “divergent expectations” and “asymmetric information.” A seminal paper using divergent expectations
is Priest and Klein (1984). Theoretical research on the asymmetric information paradigm has been well
developed in several directions, including one-sided asymmetric information where either the uninformed
party makes the offer (screening, Bebchuk (1984), P’ng (1983)), or the informed party makes the offer
(signaling, Reinganum and Wilde (1986)); two-sided asymmetric information; and the dynamic multiple-
offer bargaining situation, etc.. Meurer (1989) applies the asymmetric information paradigm to patent
litigation. Empirically, each paradigm can find its support. For instance, Waldfogel (1998) favors the
divergent expectations story, while Froeb (1993) supports the asymmetric information approach. We adopt
the asymmetric information paradigm on the ground that the low patent quality problem can be alleviated
through discouraging applications on technologies already in the public domain, a complaint widely shared,
among others, in the software industry. A natural modeling strategy is to consider a situation where the
patent applicant, but not other parties, is aware of this gaming behavior, and public policy should address
this opportunism. In Section 5 we offer some thoughts about using other approaches to model settlement
bargaining.
10Gong and McAfee (2000) also considers a two-stage game with bargaining under two-sided private in-
formation proceeding litigation, and allow litigants choose their legal expenditure in court. However, the
authors exclude Bayesian learning after bargaining breaks down, and assume that if no settlement agreement
is reached, then the two parties learn the true probability of litigation outcomes and so there is no more
private information in the litigation subgame.
11Franzoni (1999) illustrates how settlement may hurt the deterrence objective of legal enforcement.
Friedman and Wickelgren (2008) considers the trade-off between maintaining deterrence and avoiding false
conviction (the chilling effect).
5
a` la Reinganum and Wilde (1986), where the informed party makes settlement offer,
turns out to be a non-trivial difference. At the private bargaining stage, it allows us to
obtain a “no-settlement” subgame equilibrium under which private parties cannot reach
any settlement agreement and the case is certain to be litigated. This equilibrium sur-
vives the standard D1 refinement requirement and is not obtained by Franzoni (1999)
or Friedman and Wickelgren (2008), or any case selection papers bases on asymmetric
information that we mentioned above.12
2 Model
Consider an inventor (she) seeking patent protection for her invention. Her chance
of receiving a patent depends on the examination effort exerted by the patent office.
After the patent grant, she tries to enforce her patent rights but encounters a potential
challenger (he), who may be able to invalidate the patent in court. Before litigation,
however, the two private parties negotiate to settle the case.
We proceed in two steps: We first characterize the outcome of private bargaining,
i.e., the case selection pattern, then conduct comparative static analysis to study how
the patent office performance affects this pattern. For the second step, we derive
insights about how the patent office performance would affect some policy objectives
in the presence of the private parties’ strategic behavior.
We consider two policy objectives: the overall patent quality that comes out of the
two-stage (patent examination and litigation) process; and the total cost incurred by
the patent office and the challenger. Given current concerns about the patent quality,
we give priority to the first objective. That is, we consider whether a policy adjustment
could reduce the overall examination cost without jeopardizing the patent quality. A
general welfare account will necessarily incorporate the two concerns. In addition, it
also takes into account the impact of patent quality on both the dynamic innovation
incentives and the static inefficiency associated with patent rights.13 Our focus on
patent quality then could be justified by the argument that, over the relevant range,
the concerns about innovation incentives and static efficiency dominate the examination
12Both assumptions of endogenous litigation outcome and signaling are critical to this result. In Example
2, we show that no settlement equilibrium disappears if the challenger’s litigation effort is fixed. In Appendix
C, we show that it disappears if the uninformed party makes the offer and the informed party plays mixed
strategy, as in Franzoni (1999) and Friedman and Wickelgren (2008).
13Remark 3 in Section 4 addresses the impact of patent examination on the true inventor’s returns from
using the patent system and so her R&D incentives.
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cost and mandate a higher patent quality.14
Suppose that under perfect examination, the inventor’s application will be rejected
with a probability θ. For instance, the patent examination body (say, the patent office)
has full access to all relevant information, and with probability θ a piece of patent-
defeating prior art exists which proves that the inventor’s invention doesn’t satisfy
one or several of the patentability requirements. This probability is referred to as
the “invalidity” of the patent (when issued). For simplicity, consider a two-type case
θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}, with 0 < θ < θ¯ ≤ 1. (The case of θ = 0 will be treated separately, and
our main results extend to this special case.)15 A “true” inventor, or the “good” type,
has low invalidity θ, or, equivalently, high validity: She spends considerable resources
in R&D activities and brings about technological breakthroughs. By contrast, an
inventor with high invalidity θ¯ is called the “bad” or “opportunistic” type: She exploits
the public domain and tries to patent an “old” technology. We also refer to a patent
with high validity θ (low validity θ¯) as a “strong” patent (“weak” patent, respectively).
Assume that θ is the inventor’s private information, and the challenger holds the initial
belief that Pr(θ) = α. Implicit in this assumption is an adverse selection setting on
the inventor’s side where the R&D stage has finished and so what will happen at the
patent examination stage does not affect the composition of the two types of inventor.
Define θ0 ≡ αθ + (1− α)θ¯ as the ex ante average invalidity.
We model patent examination as a “search and destroy” process: The patent office
and the private challenger can exert costly efforts eP and eC ∈ [0, 1], respectively, to
search for the prior art, and the patent protection is denied if and only if the defeating
prior art is found. The efforts eP and eC are interpreted as the probability to discover
the prior art (given existence), and will be called public and private enforcement efforts,
respectively. Assume that, conditional on the existence of prior art, the patent office’s
and the challenger’s search results are independent of each other. Given θ ∈ {θ, θ¯},
the probability to eliminate the inventor’s application by the patent office (the private
challenger) is θ ·eP (θ ·eC , respectively). Note that fixing the effort at a strictly positive
14Suppose that the social welfare function is well-behaved in that the marginal benefit is decreasing and
marginal cost increasing in patent quality. Then, raising patent quality is more likely to be optimal when
the quality is low.
15A positive probability to deny the true inventor patent protection, θ > 0, may come from a “type II”
error in the patent examination process. Patentability standards may be inappropriately interpreted such
that, for instance, once an invention is realized, others may perceive it as easier to achieve than it actually
was. This “hindersight” bias may render a genuine invention “obvious” or lacking an “inventive step,” and
so patent protection is denied. Alternatively, the patent authority may grant the monopoly rights to a true
inventor only with some probability in order to reduce the deadweight loss (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999).
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level, say, eP > 0, the weak patent is more likely to be denied patent protection than
the strong patent, θ¯eP > θeP . Because we assume that the true inventor has done
some genuine research with novel output, while the opportunistic inventor just tries
to copy and patent an existing technology, prior art should be more likely to exist in
the latter case and so it is natural to consider an examination process exhibiting this
feature.16
Let the private challenger’s search cost be c(eC), with c(0) = c
′(0) = 0, c(1) =
c′(1) = ∞, and c′ as well as c
′′
> 0. On the other hand, we assume that the patent
office is less efficient than the private challenger, with a search cost γc(eP ), where γ ≥ 1.
The cost disadvantage of the patent office may come from two sources. The patent
office examiner may have less knowledge about the current state of technology than
the private challenger, so it is more costly for the former to locate relevant prior art.
Alternatively, as suggested in Lemley (2001), the challenger may have more information
about the economic value of a patent than the patent office, and may be able to target
only those with significant values. Without access to this information, the patent
office may need to exert a uniform examination effort on a large number of patent
applications, of which only a portion has any value. This size effect may cost the patent
office more to keep the same level of scrutiny as the private challenger on important
patents.
Concerning payoffs, regardless of her type, the inventor gets a monopoly profit π > 0
when receiving the patent protection in the end of the game, and the challenger gets
a benefit b ∈ (0, π) when the patent application is rejected. Otherwise the two receive
no return. Assume that the two private players are protected by limited liability.
This payoff structure is consistent with a situation where the inventor has no capac-
ity to commercialize the patented invention and relies on the patent rights to receive
licensing payments, and the challenger is one of the downstream firms whose products
are within the patent scope. Let b be the challenger’s profit from the downstream
market, and π the total licensing income the inventor can extract. Without patent
protection the inventor gets no licensing revenue, and the challenger keeps the whole b.
When the inventor receives patent protection, in the absence of asymmetric informa-
tion or other bargaining frictions at the licensing bargaining, the inventor can extract
16If the reverse is true, i.e., for the same examination effort the strong patent is more likely to be eliminated
than the weak patent, then patent examination will only deteriorate patent quality. Furthermore, suppose
that the inventor has the option to be the good or bad type, i.e., when a moral hazard element is introduced.
Such an examination system would perform poorly as an incentive scheme to encourage innovation, for the
inventor would be induced to game the system and play the bad (opportunistic) type.
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Figure 1: Timing
the whole b from the challenger thanks to full bargaining power. The challenger then
gets zero revenue, and as long as there are other licensees, π > b.17
In the two-type case, patent quality can be conveniently defined as the probability
that the patent is issued to the true inventor. We are thus concerned with reducing
the likelihood of granting patent rights to the opportunistic inventor, whether it’s done
through private or public efforts.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the model:
• At time 0, the patent examination policy is announced;
• at time 1, after observing the policy, the inventor decides whether to file a patent
application. The game ends if no application is filed; otherwise,
• at time 2, the inventor’s application undergoes examination by the patent office.
The game ends if the patent office rejects the application; otherwise the patent
is issued, and
• at time 2.5, the inventor and challenger engage in settlement bargaining in order
to avoid an invalidation suit and share the monopoly rent π. The game ends if a
settlement agreement is reached; otherwise
• at time 3, the challenger exerts a litigation effort eC and tries to invalidate the
inventor’s patent in court.
During the pre-trial negotiation, we assign the whole bargaining power to the in-
ventor. She makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the challenger.18
17Suppose instead, that the inventor herself participates at the downstream market and wishes to exclude
other competitors, including the challenger. If the inventor receives the patent protection, she will shut
down the challenger and all the other firms and get the monopoly profit π, while the challenger will get
zero return. If the inventor is denied the patent protection, the inventor will have to to compete with
other firms. Suppose that under competition the inventor gets a profit π˜I and the challenger gets π˜C .
Assume that both π˜I ≥ 0 and π˜C > 0, and π > π˜I + π˜C . That is, competition will dissipate some,
but not all profit, and the challenger is viable under competition. Let b ≡ π˜C . It is easy to see that
π > π˜I + π˜C ≥ π˜C = b. For the inventor, we can redefine her litigation payoff and replace expression (2)
below with u˜I(θ, eC) ≡ (1 − θeC)π + θeC π˜I = π˜I + (π − π˜I)(1 − θeC), θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}. Because π − π˜I > b, our
analysis is robust to this complication.
18In Appendix C, we show that our main results are robust to the alternative distribution of bargaining
9
In the main analysis, we restrict the examination policy to the examination efforts
exerted by the patent office, eP , and assume away any costs of filing the patent ap-
plication. We consider separately applications fees and the possibility of mounting a
private patent challenge at the pre-grant stage in the end of Section 4 and Appendix
B, respectively. In the former case, limited liability is dropped out.19
3 The Limit of Private Enforcement
In this section we demonstrate that a case involving a weak patent (θ¯) is more likely
to be settled than that involving a strong patent (θ). This pattern of case selection
points out the limit of private enforcement, and is key to subsequent analysis. To
determine the bargaining outcome, let us first characterize the threat point, i.e., when
no settlement agreement is reached and the two see each other in court.
Suppose that the challenge holds a belief α˜ ∈ [0, 1] that he will encounter the true
inventor when trying to invalidate the patent in court. Denote θ˜ ≡ α˜θ+(1−α˜)θ¯ ∈ [θ, θ¯]
as the corresponding expected invalidity. The challenger’s optimal litigation effort is
determined by
e∗C(θ˜) ≡ argmax
eC
θ˜eCb− c(eC ), (1)
and the inventor’s and challenger’s expected litigation payoffs are:
uI(θ, e
∗
C) = (1− θe
∗
C)π, θ ∈ {θ, θ¯} (2)
uC(θ˜) = θ˜e
∗
Cb− c(e
∗
C). (3)
The optimal litigation effort e∗C is increasing in θ˜, and so decreasing in α˜. A lower prob-
ability of finding information and striking down the patent discourages the challenger’s
search activity. On the other hand, when engaging in a legal fight, the inventor always
prefers a less intensive attack from the challenger (a lower e∗C), while the challenger’s
payoff is decreasing in the probability of facing a strong patent α˜, or, equivalently,
increasing in θ˜.
power where the challenger makes the offer, and a more general setting where the inventor has continuous
types.
19Since we do not model the patent office as an active player, we ignore the issue of whether the patent
office could commit to the examination effort announced at time 0. Even if there is commitment problem,
our reasoning goes through as long as the examination effort is observable to other parties. In practice,
the resources available to patent office and the incentive scheme offered to patent examiners are publicly
observable, and so private parties can roughly figure out the examination effort to be exercised.
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Denote eC ≡ eC(θ) and e¯C ≡ eC(θ¯) as the minimum and maximum possible optimal
litigation efforts, corresponding to the lowest and highest possible θ, respectively. The
optimal effort e∗C lies in the interval ∈ [eC , e¯C ]. Note that eC > 0 for θ > 0. It is easy to
check that, given the same private litigation effort, the true inventor’s expected payoff
from litigation is strictly higher than that of the opportunistic player (uI(θ, eC) >
uI(θ¯, eC), ∀eC ∈ [eC , e¯C ]); and that, through its effect on e
∗
C via θ˜, an inventor’s
litigation payoff is increasing in the belief α˜ (for both θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}, uI(θ, e
∗
C) is increasing
in α˜).
Consider the bargaining stage. A settlement offer is a transfer between the inventor
and challenger. If the inventor’s settlement offer s is accepted by the challenger,20 the
inventor’s and challenger’s payoffs are π − s and s, respectively. But if the offer is
rejected and litigation ensues, the inventor receives an expected payoff uI(θ, e
∗
C) and
the challenger receives uC(θ˜), where θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}, and e
∗
C as well as θ˜ are determined by
the challenger’s belief in court α˜. By b < π, the case is always settled under symmetric
information: π − uC(θ) > uI(θ, eC) and π − uC(θ¯) > uI(θ¯, e¯C). The following lemma
characterizes the case selection pattern in our model, i.e., which type of inventor is
more likely to litigate.
Lemma 1. (Case selection). Consider the bargaining between the inventor and chal-
lenger.
• There is no bargaining equilibrium in which the true inventor settles, but the
opportunistic inventor litigates (even with only some probability).
• There is a bargaining equilibrium in which the opportunistic inventor litigates with
a strict positive probability only when
uI(θ¯, eC) > π − uC(θ¯). (4)
Intuitively, when one party holds private information about her case quality (θ
here), a stronger case (lower θ) makes a “tougher” player at the bargaining table and
so a settlement deal is harder to reach. This result of “the innocent’s curse” is fairly
general and well-established in the literature of law and economics. In our context, it
suggests that private enforcement cannot only be directed toward the “right target,”
that is, the weak patent; provoking private litigation at best improves patent quality
at the expense of the true inventor.
20This offer s may depend on the type of the inventor. See the proof for more details.
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To understand condition (4), the necessary condition when private enforcement can
possibly eliminate the weak patent, note that uI(θ¯, eC) and uC(θ¯) are the opportunistic
inventor’s and the challenger’s highest possible payoff in litigation, respectively. The
challenger is willing to accept a settlement payment uC(θ¯) because this is his maximum
possible payoff in court. The opportunistic inventor thus can guarantee herself a payoff
π−uC(θ¯) in a settlement. Because litigation gives the opportunistic inventor at most a
payoff uI(θ¯, eC), when condition (4) fails, the opportunistic inventor prefers settlement
to litigation.
When condition (4) fails, private enforcement cannot improve the patent quality,
i.e., the probability that only the strong patent remains in the economy. When both
types of inventor settle, private enforcement is inactive and the patent quality is solely
determined by the patent office examination level. And when only the true inventor
litigates, the weak patent won’t be invalidated in court and so the patent quality is
lower after private litigation.
Corollary 1. When uI(θ¯, eC) ≤ π − uC(θ¯), private enforcement doesn’t improve the
patent quality.
Remark 1. (“Harassing” the true inventor). In the context of innovation, the “the
innocent’s curse,” i.e., the true inventor’s higher litigation risk, may translate into
a higher probability of losing patent protection. This would be the case when the
challenger litigates only against the true inventor, while settling the case with the
opportunistic inventor.21 When this happens, not only is a trued inventor “harassed”
when trying to enforce her patent rights,22 but private enforcement also reduces the
true inventor’s payoff and impairs R&D incentives without offsetting gains to raise the
patent quality. 
We offer two special cases before characterizing the equilibrium of the bargaining
game.
21Other bargaining outcomes are considered in the proof of Proposition 1. We show that when uI(θ, eC) ≥
π − uC(θ¯) ≥ uI(θ¯, eC), there is a PBE where the true inventor litigates for sure and the opportunistic
inventor settles for sure, with litigation efforts eC . In this equilibrium, the probability that the opportunistic
inventor and true inventor receive patent rights are 1 − θ¯eP and (1 − θeP )(1 − θeC), respectively. The
opportunistic inventor has higher probability to survive and receive patent protection than the true inventor
if 1 − θ¯eP > (1 − θeP )(1 − θeC) ⇒ θeC(1 − θeP ) > eP (θ¯ − θ). It is more likely to be the case when eP is
small.
22The harassment hypothesis usually refers to invalidation challenges facing a patent-holder from potential
infringers or other stake-holders. One possible litigation shown in our model is exactly this invalidation suit.
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Example 1. (An ironclad strong patent). When the strong patent can never be inval-
idated, θ = 0, as in Franzoni (1999), there is some probability that an opportunistic
inventor can still face litigation. This is confirmed by that fact that, under this case,
uI(θ¯, eC) = π > π − uC(θ¯).
However, without invalidation risk the true inventor will never pay the challenger
to settle the case. There is no equilibrium in which private bargaining always reaches
a deal. Another outcome ruled out by this assumption is one in which the private
challenger learns the inventor’s true type and settles with the opportunistic player
while litigating against the true inventor. By θ = 0 and so eC = 0, this equilibrium
candidate is busted by the opportunistic inventor’s attempt to mimic the good type.
Example 2. (Inelastic private enforcement capacity). Suppose that θ > 0 but the
challenger has inelastic litigation capacity, as in Meurer (1989). For simplicity, let
us consider the extreme case of fixed and costless eC > 0.
23 After this modification,
the weak patent is entirely exempted from private enforcement. A fixed eC renders
uC(θ¯) = θ¯eCb < π − uI(θ¯, eC) = θ¯eCπ, which violates condition (4).
24 This confirms
that the challenger’s litigation effort decision is a key ingredient in our analysis. 
From now on we will focus on bargaining equilibria where private litigation will be
initiated against the weak patent with a strictly positive probability. This is justified
by our interests in using private enforcement to raise patent quality. As shown in the
proof, this class of equilibria satisfies the D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).25
Suppose that the necessary condition (4) holds and so the weak patent can face an
invalidation challenge in court. We say that the weak patent is fully (partially) exposed
to private litigation if the opportunistic inventor is certain to engage in a court fight
(with a probability, respectively). By Lemma 1, whenever the opportunistic inventor
litigates, so does the true inventor. Denote αˆ as the patent quality, or the challenger’s
23With costly but fixed effort, we need only that the challenger has a credible threat to incur the cost in
a legal fight, e.g., by assuming a cost smaller than θeCb.
24Introducing litigation cost only strengthens this result.
25The D1 criterion constrains the weight the challenger can put on the opportunistic type when litigation
is an off-path event. Roughly speaking, the true inventor would have more to gain than the opportunistic
inventor in a legal fight, and so D1 requires the opportunistic inventor be fully deleted from the challenger’s
off-path belief.
In the proof, we also consider other bargaining outcomes such as where both types of inventor settle
and there is no litigation, and where only the true inventor litigates. However, no PBE exists that fulfills
the criterion D1 and implements the two outcomes. “Divinity,” though, retains these bargaining outcomes
(Bank and Sobel, 1987). As a weaker requirement it only requires that the challenger believe the true
inventor plays the deviant move at least as often as the opportunistic inventor. The “passive belief,” for
example, is allowed under divinity but not under D1.
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belief, at the beginning of the bargaining stage, and define θˆ ≡ αˆθ + (1− αˆ)θ¯.
Proposition 1. (Private enforcement). Suppose that condition (4) holds. The Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria (henseforth, PBE) that survive D1 are
• Full exposure: When uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)) ≥ π − uC(θ¯), there is a PBE in which no
settlement is reached at all, and the challenger exerts litigation effort e∗C(θˆ); and
• partial exposure: if uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)) < π−uC(θ¯) < uI(θ¯, eC), there is a PBE in which
the opportunistic inventor litigates with probability x∗ ∈ (0, 1), the true inventor
always litigates, and the challenger, with a belief α∗x upon litigation, exerts a
litigation effort e∗C,x < e
∗
C(θˆ), where e
∗
C,x, x
∗, and α∗x are determined by
uI(θ¯, e
∗
C,x) = π − uC(θ¯), e
∗
C,x = e
∗
C
(
α∗xθ + (1− α
∗
x)θ¯
)
, α∗x =
αˆ
αˆ+ (1− αˆ)x∗
. (5)
In the full exposure regime, the opportunistic inventor fully mimics the true in-
ventor and litigates with probability one. The equilibrium litigation effort, e∗C(θˆ), is
determined by the initial belief αˆ at the bargaining stage. Because the challenger is
willing to accept a settlement offer uC(θ¯), this equilibrium requires patent quality αˆ be
high enough, so that θˆ and litigation effort e∗C(αˆ) low enough: uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)) ≥ π−uC(θ¯).
In the partial exposure regime, the opportunistic inventor plays a mixed strategy
and litigates with probability x∗ ∈ (0, 1). Settlement, then, reveals the inventor’s type
and the challenger will only accept the offer uC(θ¯). To be willing to play a mixed
strategy, the opportunistic inventor must be indifferent between paying uC(θ¯) to settle
and litigating against the equilibrium effort e∗C,x, i.e., π−uC(θ¯) = uI(θ¯, e
∗
C,x). This pins
down the equilibrium litigation effort, which in turn has to be the challenger’s optimal
response to a belief α∗x, i.e., e
∗
C,x = e
∗
C(α
∗
xθ+ (1−α
∗
xθ¯)). The equilibrium belief, α
∗
x, is
determined by both the initial belief αˆ and the probability that the opportunistic in-
ventor plays litigation. The opportunistic inventor’s equilibrium probability to litigate,
x∗, is fixed according to condition (5).
4 Public vs. Private Enforcement: Substitutes
or Complements?
Let us turn to the relationship between public and private enforcement. Again we
assume condition (4) holds and consider bargaining equilibria under which the weak
patent will be litigated with strictly positive probability.
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Recall that θ0 ≡ αθ + (1− α)θ¯ is the belief of patent invalidity at the beginning of
the game. After patent issuance, by observing the patent office examination effort eP ,
the challenger adjusts his assessment of facing a strong patent to
αˆ =
α(1− θeP )
α(1− θeP ) + (1− α)(1 − θ¯eP )
=
α(1 − θeP )
1− θ0eP
. (6)
This can be seen as the quality of an issued patent, and is also the challenger’s belief
when settlement bargaining starts. Intuitively, a higher level of public enforcement eP
raises the patent quality:
∂αˆ
∂eP
=
α(1− α)(θ¯ − θ)
(1− θ0eP )2
> 0. (7)
Due to this monotonic relationship, we can consider the impact of public enforcement
eP by directly looking at the effect of patent quality αˆ on private enforcement.
According to Proposition 1, whether the weak patent falls into the full or partial
exposure regime depends crucially on patent quality αˆ. As discussed above, the full
exposure regime requires a high enough patent quality αˆ, so that the equilibrium
litigation effort e∗C(θˆ) is low enough. Intuitively, the opportunistic inventor is willing
to mix with the true inventor and litigate only when she expects a low litigation effort
in court. This is more likely to be the case when the patent office exerts significant
examination effort eP and maintains high patent quality αˆ. Furthermore, in this regime
a marginal increase in public enforcement eP will reduce private enforcement effort eC ,
for a higher patent quality αˆ weakens the challenger’s litigation effort. In this regime,
public enforcement crowds out private enforcement.
The partial exposure regime, on the other hand, happens for low αˆ. In this case, low
patent quality, the result of low public enforcement level eP , triggers a high litigation
effort e∗C(θˆ) from the challenger, should the opportunistic inventor fully mix with the
true inventor to litigate in court. Relative to facing a very litigious challenger in court,
with an expected payoff uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)), the opportunistic inventor is willing to offer
the challenger a payment uC(θ¯) to settle the case. In equilibrium, the opportunistic
inventor is indifferent between litigation and settlement and plays a mixed strategy as
described in Proposition 1.
Unlike the previous case, the partial regime exhibits a positive relationship between
public and private enforcement. By Proposition 1 the opportunistic inventor’s litigation
probability x∗ = [αˆ(1−α∗x)]/[(1− αˆ)α
∗
x] is increasing in αˆ. Together with the fact that
the belief α∗x and litigation effort e
∗
C,x are fixed in this case, the probability that the
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Figure 2: Patent quality and private enforcement
weak patent will be eliminated by private force, x∗ · e∗C,x, is strictly increasing in eP .
In the partial exposure regime, public enforcement crowds in private enforcement.
The reason is that, referring to condition (5), under partial exposure the litigation
effort e∗C,x is determined such that the opportunistic inventor is indifferent between
paying uC(θ¯) to settle the case and facing a challenge with effort e
∗
C,x. On the other
hand, to have e∗C,x as the best response, the challenger should hold a belief α
∗
x when
filing a challenge. Since a higher eP will raise the quality of an issued patent αˆ,
the opportunistic inventor should litigate more (raise x∗) in order to maintain the
challenger’s belief at α∗x.
Figure 2 summarizes the impact of patent quality αˆ on “weak patent elimination,”
which is defined as the probability that the weak patent will be eliminated in litigation.
Since αˆ is strictly increasing in eP , it also depicts the effect of public enforcement on
private enforcement. As patent quality increases, we move from the partial exposure
(the dashed line) to the full exposure regime (the solid line). A marginal increase in
patent quality raises the probability of eliminating the weak patent in the former case,
but not in the latter case. There is a non-monotonic relationship between weak patent
elimination and patent quality.
Remark 2. (Empirical implications) It would be interesting to empirically test this
non-monotonic relationship. A major challenge, however, is to find a good proxy for
patent quality.26 Given the general perception that the level of quality control varies
26A standard measure, forward citation, may capture more than the technological merit of a patent.
Independent of the extent to which it fulfills the patentability standards, a patent would be cited more often
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in different patent offices, one might want to conduct an international comparison.
Doing so, nevertheless, requires overcoming the heterogenous litigation environments in
different jurisdictions. Another way to test the theory might be to consider the impact
of policy changes at the same patent office. For instance, in response to criticism of
its lax quality control, the USPTO first introduced the “second pair of eyes” review in
the area of business patents in 2001, and then extended it to other fields in 2004 and
2005 (Chen, 2009). Under this sysetm, a senior examiner and an examination panel
are added to review the issuance decision. Assuming that this practice does improve
patent quality, it might be desirable to check how it affects patent litigation. ‖
Now let us derive some policy implications from this non-monotonic relationship. As
discussed in the introduction, Lemley (2001)’s “rational ignorance” argument intends to
substitute public enforcement with less costly private enforcement, without jeopardizing
overall patent quality. However, our results suggest that when patent quality is already
at the low end so that the partial exposure regime prevails, a further reduction of public
enforcement effort eP will discourage private enforcement toward the weak patent and
decrease patent quality. When the economy suffers from low patent quality and raising
patent quality is the primary concern, it would be desirable to improve patent office
performance eP . The overall cost of patent quality enforcement is certain to raise,
but the key point is that in this case private enforcement is no substitute for public
enforcement. Strengthening public enforcement not only contributes directly to raise
patent quality, but also provides an indirect benefit of enhancing the involvement of
private force in the quality control process.
On the other hand, the negative relationship at the full exposure regime leaves some
scope for a “rationally ignorant” patent office. Reducing the patent office examination
effort in this regime may decrease the overall examination cost without harming patent
quality.
To check this possibility, recall that the patent office has a cost function γc(eP ),
where γ ≥ 1 and c(·) is the challenger’s cost function. Define the total cost of patent
examination as C(eP ) ≡ γc(eP ) + (1 − θ
0eP )c(e
∗
C (θˆ)). Also define the overall level of
examination a patent application is expected to receive as eP+e
∗
C , for under this regime,
a patent applicant with θ expects rejection with probability 1− (1− θeP )(1 − θe
∗
C) =
θ(eP +e
∗
C)−θ
2eP e
∗
C ≃ θ(eP +e
∗
C). We are concerned with when a marginal decrease in
eP will reduce the total cost C(eP ) without reducing the overall examination standard
when it delivers more economic values or plays a more important role in a firm’s R&D strategy.
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eP +e
∗
C , i.e., the simultaneous satisfaction of d(eP +e
∗
C)/deP ≤ 0 and dC(eP )/deP > 0.
The next proposition presents conditions when they will hold, and summarizes the main
results in this section.
Proposition 2. (Patent quality and patent office). Assume condition (4) holds so that
the weak patent may be litigated in court.
• (Partial exposure) When patent quality is low enough, αˆ < α∗x, the probability of
eliminating the weak patent through private effort, x∗ · e∗C,x, is increasing in eP .
In this regime, reducing public enforcement eP deteriorates patent quality.
• (Full exposure) When patent quality is high enough, αˆ ≥ α∗x, a higher level of pub-
lic enforcement eP reduces the probability of eliminating the weak patent through
litigation e∗C(θˆ).
Consider a marginal decrease in eP in this regime:
– it will not weaken the overall examination standard if and only if
de∗C(θˆ)
dαˆ
∂αˆ
∂eP
≤ −1 ⇒
α(1 − α)(θ¯ − θ)2b
c′′(e∗C)(1 − θ
0eP )2
≥ 1; (8)
– it will reduce the total examination cost if and only if
γ >
1
c′(eP )
[
θ0c(e∗C(θˆ))− (1− θ
0eP )c
′(e∗C(θˆ))
de∗C (θˆ)
dαˆ
∂αˆ
∂eP
]
. (9)
When both conditions hold, the rational ignorance hypothesis is supported.
Not surprisingly, to justify a not-so-excellent patent office, condition (9) requires
significant cost advantage of private enforcement, i.e., γ should be large enough. For
the overall examination standard, a sufficient condition for condition (8) to hold is:
∀eC , α(1 − α)(θ¯ − θ)
2b ≥ c
′′
(eC). This comes from the fact that the private sector’s
response should be large enough in order to compensate for a more lax public quality
control. Among others, it requires a “less curved” cost function, i.e., c′′ small enough,
as ∂e∗C(θˆ)/∂θˆ = b/c
′′
(e∗C).
Remark 3. (R&D incentives). So far we’ve ignored the true inventor’s R&D incentives.
If this concern is introduced, in the presence of a “type II error,” θ > 0, the patent
office may want to constrain its examination effort eP . Under the partial exposure
regime, this can be done by reducing eP . But in the full exposure regime, a reduction
in eP causes eC to increase, and the overall enforcement level decreases if and only if
condition (8) fails.
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However, this analysis is entirely based on the adverse selection assumption on the
inventor’s side. Instead, we may take a moral hazard view where a true inventor is
given both the opportunities of producing genuine innovations and patenting public
domain technologies. In this case, a higher overall examination standard will serve as a
more powerful “stick” to push the inventor away from the temptation of opportunistic
patenting. This provides another channel to improve patent quality.27 
Remark 4. (Application fees). Let us erase the limited liability protection and allow
a negative return for an inventor, and so application fees can be added as a policy
tool. When the patent office imposes fees on patent applicants, this ideally may deter
the opportunistic inventor from seeking patent protection. In general, a more effective
way to achieve this goal is to condition the pecuniary punishment on the examination
outcome, e.g., upon the rejection of a patent application or invalidation of an issued
patent in court. However, a fine after invalidation is arguably under the discretion of
the court, and an applicant, especially a “short-run player,” might simply run away
when her application is rejected by the patent office. Instead, we consider a uniform
application fee f for all patent applications. Nevertheless, our main result is not
affected by the fee structure under study.
Suppose that an application fee f fully deters the opportunistic inventor from ap-
plying for a patent, but not the true inventor. When this is true, at the bargaining stage
the challenger holds belief that αˆ = 1, and symmetric information prevents bargaining
breakdown. In our model, a fully deterrent application fee mutes entirely private en-
forcement. When the inventor holds the bargaining power,28 it suffices to pay uC(θ)
to settle the case, and a deterrent fee f should satisfy
(1− θ¯eP )π − uC(θ) < f ≤ (1− θeP )π − uC(θ). (10)
Since this condition will not hold when eP = 0, a deterrent application fee cannot
substitute for patent office examination. Furthermore, to preserve the true inventor’s
27To see this, suppose that for the true inventor, there is a choice between doing innovation (at a cost
K > 0, with patent validity θ) and engaging in opportunistic patenting (at no cost, with patent validity
θ¯). Assume that the weak patent is not settled for sure. The incentive compatibility constraint to push the
inventor to do R&D is (1− θeP )(1− θeC)π −K ≥ (1− θ¯eP )(1− θ¯eC)π, where eP and eC are the prevailing
public and private enforcement efforts, respectively. (Note that in the partial exposure regime, the weak
patent-holder is indifferent between litigation and settlement.) When eP · eC ≃ 0, the constraint becomes
(θ¯−θ)(eP +eC)π ≥ K, which is more likely to satisfy when the overall quality control level eP +eC is higher.
28The distribution of bargaining power is not crucial to this result. It only changes the level of f to deter
opportunistic patenting, for the patent-holder’s payoffs from fully settling the case depend on who makes
the offer.
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returns, the patent office should set f as small as possible, without losing its deterrent
power. Let fD = (1− θ¯eP )π− uC(θ) + ǫ, with ǫ > 0 but small. Since f
D is decreasing
in eP , the true inventor’s payoff, (1−θeP )π−uC(θ)−f
D = (θ¯−θ)ePπ−ǫ, is increasing
in eP .
Proposition 3. (Application fees). An application fee that fully deters opportunistic
patenting crowds out private enforcement but cannot substitute for public enforcement.
A higher patent office examination level eP reduces the necessary fee. When the appli-
cation fee is set at the minimal necessary level fD, the true inventor’s payoff, and so
the R&D incentive, is increasing in eP . 
5 Concluding Remarks
The limitation of private enforcement emphasized in this paper, namely the settlement
bias toward weak patents, would persist despite the private challenger’s information
and cost advantages. It highlights the importance of a decent patent office. Accord-
ingly, future works and reform efforts should focus on how to improve the performance
of the patent office in order to “get things right” in the first place. The agency prob-
lem and task allocations within the patent office are additional topics in our research
agenda.29
In this aspect, our analysis sheds some light on the design of incentive payments
for patent examiners. One difficulty in constructing this incentive scheme is finding
a proper index of examiners’ efforts.30 A straightforward and somewhat “naive” ap-
plication of incentive theory might suggest the use of court rulings as a measure of
performance: A patent examiner would be punished if a patent issued by her is later
invalidated in court. Several practical issues reduce the usefulness of this measure.
For instance, the rare occurrence of patent disputes and the strong tendency toward
settlement; upon dispute, the long delay from patent issuance to the final court judg-
ment; and, at least in the United States, a significant portion of patent examiners who
choose a career path in the private sector after a few years’ experience in the patent
29Merges (1999) argues that the U.S. patent examiners are given incentives to approve, but not reject patent
applications. Based on surveys of patent examiners in the USPTO and European patent office, respectively,
Cockburn et al. (2003), Friebel et al. (2006) provide useful insights about the process and feature of patent
examination, the internal functioning and organization of patent offices, and examiners’ incentives, etc..
30This issue is closely related to finding a satisfactory measure of patent quality discussed in Remark
2. Langinier and Marcoul (2009) and Schuett (2009) are two recent efforts devoted to patent examiners’
incentive problems.
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office. Our analysis points out another limitation: the information content of a court
ruling may be distorted by private bargaining. In particular, a positive relationship
between public and private enforcement in the partial exposure regime suggests that
a higher effort by the patent examiner may result in more patents being litigated and
invalidated in court. It would then be undesirable to punish the examiner upon a
successful post-grant court challenge.
Another direction for future research is to extend the analysis to more complex
environments. This would allow us to check whether our results are robust to other
bargaining paradigms.
• Two-sided asymmetric information: When enforcing her patent rights, the patent-
holder may have less information than a potential infringer about the latter’s
infringement activities (e.g. the true infringement probability or damage). This
introduces another asymmetric information element into the model. Assume that
the two pieces of private information are independently distributed. Since, ceteris
paribus, a patent-holder would be tougher at the bargaining table when having
a strong patent, this modification should have little impact on the case selection
pattern in Lemma 1. It would be interesting to see whether and how our second
main result, namely, the non-monotonic relationship between public and private
enforcement (Figure 2), would be affected in a bargaining setting characterized
by two-sided asymmetric information.
• Divergent expectations: Suppose that the hurdle of settlement is the two dis-
putants’ different assessments of case quality (patent validity here), and that they
agree to disagree regarding each other’s assessment (Priest and Klein, 1984). A
general result from this approach is that bargaining breaks down when the true
case quality falls in the “middle range,” since this is the case most likely to lead
to extreme expectations. In our context, it means that neither patents with very
low or very high validity will be litigated. Therefore, with some modification our
first result still holds: Private enforcement will only attack mediocre patents. As
to the effect of intensifying public enforcement, we need to figure out how the
patent office’s efforts affect the discrepancy between the parties’ case assessments
and true case quality. This would require a model of the expectation-generating
process (e.g., whether and how the noise comes from the litigation process as well
as court decision-making), and how it is related to the patent office examination.
• Asymmetric stakes: Alternatively, we can consider a more involved industry or
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innovation structure. For instance, in a cumulative innovation process a potential
challenger may be an inventor or patent-holder from another generation of tech-
nology development. Two twists may then be present: multiple contacts (the two
patent-holders may threat to initiate a litigation war to invalidate each other’s
patent), and reverse case stake (i.e., b > π, the potential challenger has a larger
stake to invalidate the patent than the patentee’s monopoly profit). Since quite a
few high-tech industries exhibit this feature, it would further advance our knowl-
edge of the case selection pattern, and more generally, help us understand how to
improve patent quality through the joint efforts of public and private enforcement
in specific sectors.
Appendix
A Proofs
 Lemma 1
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which the true inventor settles (with some prob-
ability) but the opportunistic inventor always litigates. Let s′ be (one of) the true
inventor’s equilibrium settlement payment(s), which may be adopted for some proba-
bility, and e′C > 0 be (one of) the litigation efforts facing the opportunistic inventor.
When the true inventor prefers settlement and paying s′ than litigation against an
effort e′C , π − s
′ ≥ uI(θ, e
′
C) > uI(θ¯, e
′
C), the opportunistic inventor has incentives to
deviate to s′ and settle.
The reason that condition (4) is the necessary condition for the opportunity type
to litigate is stated in the main context. Q.E.D.
The following lemma is convenient to subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2. (Off-path belief selection and full settlement). Consider a PBE where no
litigation occurs, and denote s as the equilibrium settlement payment from the inven-
tor to the challenger. If this equilibrium fulfills the criterion D1 (divinity), it must
be supported by off-path beliefs α˜ = Pr(θ|s˜) such that for s˜ < s, α˜ = 1 (α˜ ≥ αˆ,
respectively).
Proof. To use D1 or divinity to eliminate or constrain the weight on the opportunistic
type when observing a deviation s˜ < s, we show that whenever a (mixed strategy) best
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response of the challenger to s˜ makes the opportunistic inventor (weakly) better off
than under the equilibrium, the same response must give the true inventor a strictly
higher payoff than the equilibrium payoff.
Let s be the equilibrium payment from the inventor to the challenger in a PBE
where no litigation occurs. Note that there can be only one such payment, otherwise
the player making the offer will deviate to the payment that serves best his/her interests
without intriguing law suits. The inventor’s equilibrium payoff is π − s, regardless of
her type. Consider the challenger’s belief upon an off-path offer s˜ < s.
Suppose that the inventor makes the offer. If the challenger observes s˜ < s, denote
his mixed strategy best response as (φ˜, e˜C) and belief as α˜, where φ˜ is the probability
to accept the offer and e˜C = e
∗
C(θ˜) the litigation effort when rejecting the offer, given
θ˜ = α˜θ + (1 − α˜)θ¯. The inventor’s payoff from deviating to s˜ is therefore φ˜(π − s˜) +
(1 − φ˜)uI(θ, e˜C), θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}. By the shape of c(·), the challenger doesn’t mix among
different levels of eC .
Since π− s˜ > π−s, when φ˜ = 1 both types of inventor strictly prefer the deviation.
When φ˜ = 0, for any e˜C > 0, uI(θ, e˜C) > uI(θ¯, e˜C) and so whenever the opportunistic
inventor is (weakly) better off by deviating to s˜, the true inventor strictly prefers doing
so. The same holds when φ˜ ∈ (0, 1).
When the challenger makes the offer, to support this equilibrium the inventor must
reject s˜ and this deviant offer must lead to litigation. Previous argument guarantees
that if the opportunistic inventor weakly prefers to deviate under some e˜C , the true
inventor must strictly prefer doing so. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 1
Proof. For similar reason stated in the proof of Lemma 2, there can be at most one
equilibrium litigation effort eC .
⋄ Full exposure: Along the equilibrium path, both types of inventor propose a set-
tlement offer s < uC(θˆ) and the challenger rejects this offer while maintaining belief
at θˆ, with litigation effort e∗C(θˆ). The inventor’s equilibrium payoff is uI(θ, e
∗
C(θˆ)),
θ ∈ {θ, θ¯}. To prevent deviation, (i) since the challenger will agree to settle with a
payment uC(θ¯), the opportunistic inventor should prefer litigation to settlement for
sure, uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)) ≥ π − uC(θ¯); and (ii) for other deviations s˜ < uC(θ¯), the challenger
needs to reject s˜ and litigates with e˜C ≥ e
∗
C(θˆ), to be supported by off-path belief
α˜ ≤ αˆ.
23
⋄ Partial exposure: This is a semi-pooling equilibrium where the opportunistic inventor
mixes with the true inventor and litigate with probability x∗ ∈ (0, 1). The challenger’s
equilibrium belief upon litigation therefore is α∗x specified in condition (5), which in
turn determines e∗C,x. Since only the opportunistic inventor settles, the settlement offer
s∗ = uC(θ¯), and she is willing to play mixed strategy iff π − uC(θ¯) = uI(θ¯, e
∗
C,x). This
guarantees that the true inventor won’t deviate to offer s∗. By α∗x ∈ (αˆ, 1) and so
e∗C,x ∈ (eC , e
∗
C(θˆ)), we can find such e
∗
C,x iff π − uC(θ¯) ∈ (uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ)), uI(θ¯, eC)). To
support this equilibrium, the challenger should reject any deviant offer s˜ < uC(θ¯) and
litigate with e˜C ≥ e
∗
C,x. In other words, the challenger should put enough weight on
the opportunistic inventor upon receiving s˜ < uC(θ¯).
To show that both equilibria survive D1, it suffices to show that the opportunistic
inventor cannot be deleted in the challenger’s off-path beliefs. Since the inventor’s
equilibrium payoff is uI(θ, eC), depending on the inventor’s type and the prevailing eC
in each equilibrium, observing a deviation offer, the challenger’s response of rejection
and litigation with the equilibrium efforts level makes both types of inventor indiffer-
ent from deviation or not. And by uI(θ¯, eC) < uI(θ, eC), whenever the challenger’s
acceptance of a deviant offer makes the true inventor weakly better-off by deviating,
the opportunistic inventor strictly prefers that deviation. Hence D1 cannot rule out
the opportunistic type.
For other bargaining outcomes:
⋄ No litigation: The minimal offer to settle with both types of inventor is uC(θˆ). Let
it be an equilibrium payment. To support this equilibrium, let the challenger accept
any deviant offers larger than uC(θˆ) with, say, “passive belief” θˆ. When facing a
smaller offer, the challenger should reject it and exert litigation effort e˜C such that
uI(θ, e˜C) ≤ π − uC(θˆ). But by Lemma 2, D1 requires that the challenger believe that
such an offer comes from the good type for sure, which in turn requires the challenger
to accept any offer in (uC(θ), uC(θˆ)). Therefore no PBE fulfilling D1 can implement
this outcome. On the other hand, since the passive belief is allowed under divinity, and
uI is decreasing in eC , no litigation can be implemented by a PBE satisfying divinity
if uI(θ, e
∗
C(θˆ)) ≤ π − uC(θˆ).
⋄ Only the true inventor litigates: First consider a full separating equilibrium such that
the true inventor always litigates while the opportunistic inventor always settles. In
this case, the opportunistic inventor’s equilibrium offer is uC(θ¯), and the true inventor
litigates against an effort eC . Neither type will deviate to play the other’s equilibrium
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strategy when uI(θ, eC) ≥ π−uC(θ¯) ≥ uC(θ¯, eC). No inventor would offer higher than
uC(θ¯) to settle the case. To support the equilibrium, the challenger has to reject a
deviant offer s˜ < uC(θ¯) and litigating with e˜C ≥ eC . Since the inventor can be sure to
face the minimal effort eC by proposing the true inventor’s offer (it could be an empty
offer), no patent-holder has incentives to deviate to any other offers strictly smaller
than uC(θ).
Consider a deviant offer s˜ ∈ [uC(θ), uC(θ¯)). To reject this offer, the challenger
should put enough weight on the opportunistic type, i.e., θ˜ so high that s˜ < uC(θ˜).
We show that for s˜ small enough, D1 would require Pr(θ|s˜) = 1 and so this outcome
cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Relaxing the requirement to divinity,
this outcome is possible only when αˆ small enough. Denote (φ˜, e˜C) as the challenger’s
optimal response to s˜, which is rationalized by belief α˜.
If s˜ ∈ [π−uI(θ, eC), uC(θ¯)), the challenger’s response φ˜ = 1 makes the opportunistic
inventor, but not the true inventor, strictly better off, relative to their equilibrium
payoffs. D1 and divinity cannot constrain θ˜. For s˜ ∈ [uC(θ), π − uI(θ, eC)), (i) if
φ˜ = 1, both types of inventor strictly prefer s˜ than their equilibrium strategy; (ii) if
φ˜ = 0 and π − uC(θ¯) > uI(θ¯, eC), whatever e˜C , this response cannot make the good
(opportunistic) inventor strictly (weakly, respectively) better off; and (iii) if φ˜ ∈ (0, 1),
then for the challenger to take mixed strategy response, s˜ = uC(θ˜) and e˜C = e
∗
C(θ˜).
The opportunistic inventor weakly prefers to deviate if
φ˜(π − s˜) + (1− φ˜)uI(θ¯, e˜C) ≥ π − uC(θ¯)⇒ φ˜ ≥ φ¯ ≡
π − uC(θ¯)− uI(θ¯, e˜C)
π − uC(θ˜)− uI(θ¯, e˜C)
; (A.1)
and the true inventor strictly prefers to deviate if
φ˜(π − s˜) + (1− φ˜)uI(θ, e˜C) > uI(θ, eC) (A.2)
⇒ π − uC(θ˜) > uI(θ, e˜C) and φ˜ > φ ≡
uI(θ, eC)− uI(θ, e˜C)
π − uC(θ˜)− uI(θ, e˜C)
. (A.3)
D1 and divinity have no bite for those s˜ such that π − uC(θ˜) ≤ uI(θ, e˜C). But this
won’t be the case for all θ˜, for π > uI(θ, eC) + uC(θ) as θ˜ → θ (as s˜→ uC(θ)). Define
S˜ ≡ {s˜ : uI(θ, e˜C) + uC(θ˜) < π, φ¯ > φ}. S˜ 6= ∅ since, as s˜→ uC(θ),
φ¯→
π − uC(θ¯)− uI(θ¯, eC)
π − uC(θ)− uI(θ¯, eC)
> 0, but φ→
uI(θ, eC)− uI(θ, eC)
π − uC(θ)− uI(θ, eC)
= 0. (A.4)
For all s˜ ∈ S˜, the set of the challenger’s strictly mixed strategy best responses that
makes the true inventor strictly prefer to deviate is strictly larger than the set that
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makes the opportunistic inventor weakly prefer to deviate. Therefore, for any s′ ∈ S′ ≡
S˜ ∩ [uC(θ), π−uI(θ, eC)), D1 requires the challenger to hold belief θ
′ = θ, and divinity
requires a belief θ′ ≤ θˆ. Imposing D1 then eliminates this full separating equilibrium,
as the challenger should accept the offer uC(θ). And divinity will bust the equilibrium
when αˆ is so large, and θˆ so small that uC(θˆ) ≤ s
′ for some s′ ∈ S′, since the challenger
needs to reject s′ with some θ′ such that uC(θ
′) > s′.
Lastly, suppose π−uC(θ¯) = uI(θ¯, eC). In this case D1 and divinity have no bite for
(i) when s˜ = uC(θ), the challenger’s response φ˜ = 0 and e˜C = eC makes both types of
inventor indifferent between deviation or not; and (ii) when s˜ ∈ (uC(θ), π− uI(θ, eC)),
φ¯ =
uI(θ¯, eC)− uI(θ¯, e˜C)
π − uC(θˆ)− uI(θ¯, e˜C)
=
θ¯(e˜C − eC)π
θ¯e˜Cπ − uC(θ˜)
< φ =
θ(e˜C − eC)π
θe˜Cπ − uC(θ˜)
, (A.5)
even when π − uC(θˆ)− uI(θ, e˜C) > 0.
⋄ The true inventor plays mixed strategies: Lastly, if the true inventor plays the mixed
strategy, denote y∗ as her equilibrium probability to settle. The challenger’s belief
upon settlement then is α∗y, with θ
∗
y = α
∗
yθ+(1−α
∗
y)θ¯, and the equilibrium settlement
offer s∗ = uC(θ
∗
y), such that
uI(θ, eC) = π − uC(θ
∗
y) and α
∗
y =
αˆy∗
αˆy∗ + 1− αˆ
. (A.6)
Since only the true inventor litigates, the equilibrium litigation effort is eC . The true
inventor is willing to play a mixed strategy iff uI(θ, eC) = π−uC(θ
∗
y), which leaves the
opportunistic inventor no incentives to deviate and litigate. Since α∗y ∈ (0, αˆ) and so
uC(θ
∗
y) ∈ (uC(θˆ), uC(θ¯)), this equilibrium requires uI(θ, eC) ∈ (π − uC(θ¯), π − uC(θˆ)).
Note that any deviant offer leading to litigation won’t disturb this equilibrium, for
the inventor’s equilibrium payoff is π − uC(θ
∗
y) = uI(θ, eC) > uI(θ¯, eC). We then
check whether there is belief satisfying divinity and inducing the challenger’s rejection
of a deviant offer s˜ ∈ [uC(θ¯), uC(θ
∗
y)). Since α
∗
y < αˆ and so uC(θˆ) < uC(θ
∗
y), (i)
for s˜ ∈ [uC(θ), uC(θˆ)), whether divinity can trim the challenger’s off-path belief, upon
deviation we can use the passive belief θˆ to justify the challenger’s rejection; and (ii) for
s˜ ∈ [uC(θˆ), uC(θ
∗
y)), it can be rejected only with belief θ˜ such that uC(θ˜) > s˜ ≥ uC(θˆ),
and so to have θ˜ > θˆ the weight on the opportunistic inventor should not be constrained
by divinity. The challenger’s accepting s˜ makes both types of inventor strictly better
off; his rejection, together with litigation effort strictly higher than eC makes the
inventor worse off. But if the challenger plays a mixed strategy composed of φ˜ ∈ (0, 1)
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and e˜C , since the inventor’s equilibrium payoff doesn’t not depend on her type, and
φ˜(π − s˜) + (1− φ˜)uI(θ, e˜C) > φ˜(π − s˜) + (1− φ˜)uI(θ¯, e˜C), (A.7)
whenever the opportunistic inventor weakly prefers to deviate, the true inventor strictly
prefers to do so. For this range of s˜, divinity then requires off-path belief θ˜ ≤ θˆ, and
so this equilibrium cannot survive divinity. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 2
Proof. The necessary and sufficient conditions come directly from d[eP +e
∗
C(θˆ)]/deP ≤
0 and dC(eP )/deP > 0: A marginal change in eP causes a change in the overall
standard by
d[eP + e
∗
C(θˆ)]
deP
= 1 +
de∗C(θˆ)
dαˆ
∂αˆ
∂eP
= 1−
(θ¯ − θ)b
c′′(e∗C)
α(1− α)(θ¯ − θ)
(1− θ0eP )2
, (A.8)
and a change in the total cost by
dC(eP )
deP
= γc′(eP )− θ
0c(e∗C(θˆ)) + (1− θ
0eP )c
′(e∗C(θˆ))
de∗C(θˆ)
dαˆ
∂αˆ
∂eP
. (A.9)
The sufficient condition of no lower examination standard is obtained by setting eP = 0
in condition (8), and the necessary condition of no larger cost is obtained by inserting
(de∗C/dαˆ)(∂αˆ/∂eP ) ≤ −1 into dC(eP )/deP > 0. Q.E.D.
B Pre-grant Challenges
In this appendix, we consider a pre-grant challenge system. Suppose that after receiving
a patent application but before starting its examination process (time 1.5 in Figure 3),
the patent office publishes the application and allows third parties to challenge it (or
to submit information concerning its patentability).31
Introducing a pre-grant challenge procedure allows the patent office to set different
examination levels according to an application’s history. Let ecP be the examination
effort exerted on an application that has survived private challenges, and enP on one
which has not yet been challenged. Intuitively, the patent office should set ecP ≤ e
n
P . In
31Early publication of patent applications (18 months after filing) has been widely adopted in Japan and
Europe; the U.S. has the same procedure but allows an applicant to opt out. About the pre-grant challenge,
the 2007 Patent Reform Act in the U.S. introduces a procedure permitting third parties to submit relevant
information before the issuance of a patent.
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Figure 3: Timing with pre-grant challenges
addition to the fact that private enforcement efforts perform as a “certificate” about
the validity of an application, one might cite the case selection pattern of Lemma 1 as
another support of such a policy.
However, under such a policy, an applicant may try to circumvent the high effort enP
by arranging a “fake” challenge, in particular when the patent office is unable to verify
the challenger’s effort level. That is, whether the challenger only initiates a nominal
challenge procedure without any serious effort to strike down the application. Besides,
we further argue that (i) the “direction” of case selection may be reversed at the pre-
grant challenge stage. Contrary to the previous result, there may exist an equilibrium
where only the true inventor settles at the pre-challenge bargaining; and (ii) when the
challenger does intend to initiate a challenge, and both pre- and post-grant challenges
are available, he may want to wait and file a private challenge only after the failure of
the patent office.32 That is, the challenger may want to free ride on the patent office’s
efforts.
For the first point, suppose that the challenger can only initiate a challenge at the
pre-grant stage, and that the inventor’s settlement payment comes from the monopoly
rent and so is paid only when the patent is issued. (This is the case when the inventor
is protected by limited liability.) Recall that the challenger cannot commit to eC in
an agreement, and his initial belief of patent (application) quality is α. We derive
conditions under which there is a separating equilibrium where only the true inventor
settles. A necessary condition is both θ and ecP > 0. The former is simply due to the
fact that a true inventor with θ = 0 will never pay anything to settle. The latter can
be justified in that the patent office doesn’t “outsource” the examination task entirely
to private parties, or doesn’t “rubber stamp” the issuance of a patent following private
efforts. Even if an application survives private challenges, the patent office still does
its own work.
32Of course, this is more likely the case when costs accrued to challengers are not so different for the post-
and pre-grant challenge procedures.
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Intuitively, when the patent office sets different examination levels according to the
challenge history, the inventor will take this into account when making settlement de-
cisions. Consider if enP >> e
c
P , that is, if an unchallenged application will receive much
more attention from the patent office than an application surviving private challenges.
This gives an applicant incentives not to settle with a private challenger in order to
avoid stringent public scrutiny. But the magnitude of this effect depends on the true
quality of the invention θ. For instance, when θ is very close to zero, even enP ≃ 1
won’t harm the true inventor too much. This may reverse the case selection pattern
at the pre-grant challenge stage: Only the true inventor settles and faces the high enP ,
and the opportunistic inventor experiences a private challenge as well as the low ecP .
The following proposition confirms this scenario.
Proposition 4. (Pre-grant challenges and reverse case selection). Suppose that the
challenger can only file a challenge at the pre-grant stage. There is a PBE where only
the opportunistic inventor is challenged when
(1− θ¯e¯C)(1 − θ¯e
c
P )
(1− θ¯enP )
≥
π − s
π
≥
(1− θe¯C)(1− θe
c
P )
(1− θenP )
, (B.1)
where s = [uC(θ) + (1− θeC)θe
c
P b]/(1 − θe
n
P ).
Proof. In a separating equilibrium where only the true inventor settles, along the equi-
librium path the settlement payment s is determined by the challenger’s indifference
between accepting the offer or litigating against the true inventor. Note that upon
settlement, the challenger receives s only when the application survives subsequent
public enforcement enP . And the opportunistic inventor faces private challenge efforts
e¯C , and public examination e
c
P if survives the challenge. Condition (B.1) comes from
that neither type of inventor is willing to deviate to mimic the other type. That
is, the true inventor prefers paying s than encountering two stages of enforcement,
(1 − θenP )(π − s) ≥ (1 − θe¯C)(1 − θe
c
P )π; and the opportunistic inventor prefers ex-
amination than settlement, (1 − θ¯e¯C)(1 − θ¯e
c
P )π ≥ (1 − θ¯e
n
P )(π − s). To support this
equilibrium, the challenger accepts any deviant offer s′ > s, and rejects any s′ < s
whiling litigating with efforts e¯C . Q.E.D.
First note that condition (B.1) won’t hold when ecP = 0. For in this case, a necessary
condition of this equilibrium,
(1− θ¯e¯C)(1 − θ¯e
c
P )
(1− θ¯enP )
≥
(1− θe¯C)(1− θe
c
P )
(1− θenP )
, (B.2)
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reduces to enP ≥ e¯C , contradictory with
1− θe¯C
1− θenP
≤
π − s
π
< 1. (B.3)
In order to consider when it’s more likely to have this equilibrium, let us fix e¯C , θ,
and ecP at strictly positive levels, but less than one. Suppose that s is small enough
(due to, say, a small b) so that
π − s
π
≥ (1− θe¯C)
1− θecP
1− θ
≥ (1− θe¯C)
1− θecP
1− θenP
. (B.4)
That is, the second inequality in condition (B.1) holds for all enP . In this case, the
separating equilibrium exists as long as
(1− θ¯e¯C)
1− θ¯ecP
1− θ¯enP
≥ 1⇒
1− θ¯ecP
1− θ¯enP
≥
1
1− θ¯e¯C
. (B.5)
For all possible θ¯, it is more likely to hold as enP grows larger. In the extreme case of
θ¯ = 1, this condition is guaranteed when enP is large enough. This equilibrium exists
exactly when the weak patent is of the worst kind, and the patent office exerts maximal
efforts to eliminate it when trying to exploit the information provided by case selection.
Remark. (Can sequential private challenges reverse the pattern?) One might suspect
that the reverse pattern of case selection is generated by sequential efforts to eliminate
patent applications, and could happen as well under post-grant challenges with multiple
potential challengers.
For simplicity, suppose there are two potential challengers C1 and C2, with identical
cost c(·) and benefit b . If the inventor’s bargaining with C1 results in the litigation of
opportunistic inventor and settlement of true inventor, then C1 exerts litigation efforts
e¯C . Denote the true inventor’s settlement offer as s1. This separating equilibrium
fully reveals the inventor’s type, and so, knowing the litigation history, there will be
no litigation between C2 and the inventor (when the opportunistic inventor survives
C1’s challenge). C2 will settle with the good (opportunistic) inventor with a payment
uC(θ) (uC(θ¯), respectively). Since
π − s1 − uC(θ) ≥ (1− θe¯C)π − uC(θ¯) > (1− θ¯e¯C)π − uC(θ¯), (B.6)
the opportunistic inventor will deviate to mimic the true inventor. The reverse pattern
of case selection will not happen under sequential private challenges. 
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Now, consider a potential challenger’s timing choice. Suppose that both pre- and
post-grant challenges are available to the challenger, but there is only one challenge
opportunity. In the absence of a settlement agreement, with belief α and corresponding
θ0,33 the challenger’s payoff from initiating a pre-grant challenge is uC(θ
0) + [1 −
θ0e∗C(θ
0)]ecP θ
0b. If the challenger waits after the patent issuance, his expected payoff
is θ0enP b+ (1− θ
0enP )uC(θˆ), where θˆ = αˆθ+ (1− αˆ)θ¯ and αˆ is determined according to
condition (6), with eP = e
n
P . Since αˆ > α for all e
n
P > 0, θˆ < θ
0, e∗C(θ
0) > e∗C(θˆ), and
c(e∗C(θ
0)) > c(e∗C (θˆ)). We should expect more intensive private challenge efforts at the
pre-grant stage than at the post-grant stage.
Because
uC(θ
0) + [1− θ0e∗C(θ
0)]ecP θ
0b
< θ0e∗C(θ
0)b− (1− θ0enP )c(e
∗
C (θ
0)) + [1− θ0e∗C(θ
0)]ecP θ
0b
= − (1− θ0enP )c(e
∗
C(θ
0)) + b
[
θ0e∗C(θ
0) + (1− θ0e∗C(θ
0))θ0ecP
]
,
(B.7)
and
θ0enP b+ (1− θ
0enP )uC(θˆ)
= − (1− θ0enP )c(e
∗
C(θˆ)) + b
[
θ0enP + (1− θ
0enP )θˆe
∗
C(θˆ)
]
,
(B.8)
a sufficient condition for the challenger to choose the post-grant procedure is
enP − e
c
P > e
∗
C(θ
0)(1 − θ0ecP ). (B.9)
This condition is more likely to hold as enP gets larger and e
c
P gets smaller. That is, the
challenger will postpone and free ride on public efforts if the patent office targets and
exert much higher efforts towards those applications not being protested by private
players.
Proposition 5. (Timing to challenge). When condition (B.9) holds, a potential chal-
lenger prefers to challenge at the post-grant stage.
C Alternative Settings (Not for publication)
This appendix extends our main results to settings where (i) the potential challenger
makes the settlement offer; or (ii) the inventor’s possible types are continuous.
33This α may be the initial belief when there is no bargaining at all between the inventor and challenger,
or the belief after the breakdown of a settlement negotiation.
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 When the challenger makes the offer: Assign the bargaining power to the
challenger in the two-type case. Given belief αˆ (and so average invalidity θˆ), if the
challenger decides not to settle at all, his expected litigation payoff is uC(θˆ). If he
wants to settle only with the opportunistic inventor, the settlement offer (the payoff
he promises to the inventor) is uI(θ¯, eC), and he will exert effort eC against the true
inventor (recall that this effort cannot be part of the settlement agreement). His payoff
under “partial settlement” is αˆuC(θ) + (1− αˆ)[π − uI(θ¯, eC)].
To fully settle the case the inventor’s willingness to accept the challenger’s offer
depends on the eC at the off-path event of litigation, and a higher eC pushes down the
settlement offer. But next proposition shows that only eC fulfills the criterion D1.
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By offering uI(θ, eC), the challenger’s payoff from fully settlement is π − uI(θ, eC).
Define the following terms:
α¯1 : π − uI(θ, eC) ≡ α¯1uC(θ) + (1− α¯1)[π − uI(θ¯, eC)], (C.1)
α¯2 : uC(α¯2θ + (1− α¯2)θ¯) ≡ π − uI(θ, eC), (C.2)
α¯3 : uC(α¯3θ + (1− α¯3)θ¯) ≡ α¯3uC(θ) + (1− α¯3)[π − uI(θ¯, eC)], s.t. α¯3 < 1. (C.3)
α¯1 is the cutoff level where the challenger is indifferent between full settlement and
settling only with the opportunistic inventor (partial settlement). By the same token,
α¯2 is the cutoff where the challenger is indifferent between no settlement at all and
full settlement; and α¯3 the cutoff for indifference between no settlement and partial
settlement. Note that α¯1 ∈ (0, 1) is always well-defined, but there not may exist α¯2
and α¯3 in the open interval (0, 1).
Proposition 6. (Bargaining equilibria when the challenger makes the offer). Let the
challenger make the settlement offer. Suppose that the inventor agrees to settle when-
ever she is indifferent between settlement or not, the offer to fully settle the case in a
PBE surviving D1 is uI(θ, eC). In this case, the weak patent is fully exposed to private
enforcement only when uI(θ¯, eC) > π− uC(θ¯), and (i) αˆ < α¯2, in the case of α¯1 ≤ α¯2;
or (ii) αˆ < α¯3, in the case of α¯1 > α¯2. Otherwise, either there is no litigation or only
the true inventor litigates.
Suppose that the inventor may also respond to the challenger’s offer in mixed strate-
gies, then the challenger’s payoff is strictly higher when the weak patent is only partially
exposed to private enforcement than when full exposure. When uI(θ¯, eC) > π − uC(θ¯)
34However, the general pattern of bargaining outcomes is not affected by this selection.
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and αˆ small enough so that full litigation is optimal in the previous case, it is op-
timal for the challenger to make a settlement offer uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz)) and exert litiga-
tion efforts e∗C(θz) such that the opportunistic inventor will litigate with probability
z ∈ (0, 1) and the true inventor will always litigate, where θz = αzθ + (1 − αz)θ¯ and
αz ≡ αˆ/[αˆ+ (1− αˆ)z] ∈ (αˆ, 1). The challenger’s payoff is
max
αz
Uz =
αˆ
αz
uC(θz) + (1−
αˆ
αz
)[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz))]. (C.4)
Proof. Suppose that the inventor will agree to settle upon indifference. To fully settle
the case, the challenger needs to offer a payoff uI(θ, e), where e ∈ [eC , e¯C ] is determined
by the challenger’s off-path belief should the inventor reject the offer. The lowest offer,
uI(θ, e¯C), is supported by the belief that the rejection must come from the opportunistic
inventor. According to Lemma 2, however, this belief fails D1. The lemma also shows
that the only off-path belief surviving D1 is that such rejection must be from the
good type; and so the offer could be supported by a PBE with D1 is uI(θ, eC). By
comparing the challenger’s payoffs from different settlement policies, we get the range
of αˆ such that the challenger will not settle at all.
Suppose that the inventor can respond to the challenger’s offer with mixed strate-
gies. First note that it won’t be in the challenger’s interests to induce mixed strategy
responses from the true inventor. In that case, the challenger offers a payoff uI(θ, eC)
so that the true inventor is indifferent between settlement and litigation; and since the
opportunistic inventor always settles, the litigation effort is eC . The true inventor’s
probability of acceptance will only change the belief upon settlement, but neither the
settlement offer nor the litigation effort. By π − uI(θ, eC) > uC(θ), the challenger’s
payoff is increasing in the probability of the true inventor’s settlement; the challenger
can increase his offer by a very small amount to guarantee full settlement.
Let the opportunistic inventor adopt mixed strategy responses. Given αˆ, if she
litigates with probability z ∈ (0, 1) upon indifference, then the challenger’s belief upon
litigation becomes αz ≡ αˆ/[αˆ + (1 − αˆ)z] ∈ (αˆ, 1), and litigation efforts e
∗
C(θz) ∈
(eC , e
∗
C(θˆ)). As z increases, αz decreases and e
∗
C(θz) increases. For the opportunistic
inventor to be indifferent, the challenger offers a settlement payoff uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz)). By
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doing so, the challenger’s payoff is
Uz =αˆ[θe
∗
C(θz)b− c(e
∗
C(θz))]
+ (1− αˆ)
{
z[θ¯e∗C(θz)b− c(e
∗
C(θz))] + (1− z)[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz))]
}
=[αˆ+ (1− αˆ)z]uC(θz) + (1− αˆ)(1 − z)[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz))]
=
αˆ
αz
uC(θz) + (1 −
αˆ
αz
)[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θz))].
(C.5)
The challenger can obtain a payoff Uz(αz), with any αz ∈ (αˆ, 1), when opportunistic
inventor sets z = [αˆ(1− αz)]/[(1 − αˆ)αz].
Note that as αz → αˆ, Uz → uC(θˆ), the challenger’s payoff under no settlement; and
duC(θz)
dαz
∣∣∣∣
αz=αˆ
=
1
αˆ
[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ))− uC(θˆ)] +
duC(θˆ)
dαˆ
+ (1−
αˆ
αˆ
)
duI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ))
deC
∂e∗C(θˆ)
∂αˆ
=
1
αˆ
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θˆ))− uC(θˆ)− (θ¯ − θ)e
∗
C(θˆ)b
]
>
1
αˆ
θ¯(π − b)e∗C(θˆ).
(C.6)
Full litigation is strictly dominated when the opportunistic inventor plays mixed strate-
gies. This implies that, when αˆ is small enough so that the challenger doesn’t want to
settle at all in case where the inventor always settles upon indifference, it is optimal
for the challenger to obtain a payoff Uz. On the other hand, when αˆ→ 1, the feasible
set of αz, (αˆ, 1) shrinks, and Uz → uC(θ), which is strictly smaller than π − uI(θ, eC),
the payoff from full litigation. Therefore for αˆ large enough, it won’t be optimal for
the challenger to induce mixed-strategy response from the inventor. Q.E.D.
Changing the distribution of bargaining power doesn’t change the necessary con-
dition for the weak patent to have a strictly positive litigation probability. However,
since uC(θˆ) is increasing in θˆ and so decreasing in αˆ, a higher patent quality makes
settlement more attractive to the challenger. Unlike the case where the inventor makes
the offer, in this case the opportunistic inventor is fully exposed to private enforcement
only when the patent quality is low enough. This is the major difference between the
two distributions of bargaining power.
But, in fact, in this case the full and partial exposure regimes take place for the
same range of αˆ. Different regimes ensue depending on whether the inventor is allowed
to play mixed strategies, and the challenger’s payoff improves when the opportunistic
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inventor can be induced to play mixed strategies in a proper manner, and so only
litigates with some probability.
Consider the impact of eP on different regimes. Under full exposure, there is no
settlement, and the challenger’s litigation effort is e∗C(θˆ). The crowding out effect of
public enforcement thus is robust to the distribution of bargaining power. The fol-
lowing proposition shows that the positive relationship between public and private
enforcement under partial exposure still holds provides additional conditions are im-
posed.
Proposition 7. (Partial exposure when the challenger makes the offer). When the chal-
lenger makes the offer, the weak patent may encounter a private challenge only when
uI(θ¯, eC) > π − uC(θ¯), and at the full exposure regime a higher eP reduces the chal-
lenger’s litigation efforts.
Under the partial exposure, if the challenger’s cost function satisfies c
′′′
≥ 0 and αˆ
is small enough, then the challenger’s litigation efforts is independent of eP and the
opportunistic inventor’s litigation probability is increasing in eP .
Proof. When the challenger makes the offer and the opportunistic inventor litigates
with probability z ∈ (0, 1) upon indifference, by the proof of Proposition 6 for αˆ
smaller than α¯2 or α¯3, depending on α¯ ≷ α¯2, it is optimal for the challenger to induce
the mixed-strategy response from the opportunistic inventor and obtain a payoff Uz
for some z.
Given such αˆ, denote α∗z ∈ (αˆ, 1) as the optimal belief upon litigation (derived from
the optimal z∗), and θ∗z = α
∗
zθ + (1− α
∗
z)θ¯. The challenger’s optimal payoff is
Uz(θ
∗
z) =
αˆ
α∗z
uC(θ
∗
z) + (1−
αˆ
α∗z
)[π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))]
= π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))−
αˆ
α∗z
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
]
.
(C.7)
When c
′′′
≥ 0, for all αˆ, Uz is strictly convex in αz: The first derivative is
∂Uz
∂αz
= θ¯π
∂e∗C(θz)
∂αz
+
αˆ
α2z
[θ¯πe∗C(θz)− uC(θz)]−
αˆ
αz
[θ¯π
∂e∗C(θz)
∂αz
+ (θ¯ − θ)be∗C(θz)], (C.8)
and the second derivative is
∂2Uz
∂α2z
=−
2αˆ
α3z
[
θ¯e∗C(θz)(π − αzb) + c(e
∗
C(θz)) + (θ¯ − θ)αzb
θ¯(π − αzb) + θαzb
c′′(e∗C(θz))
]
+ θ¯π(1−
αˆ
αz
)
∂2e∗C(θz)
∂α2z
< 0,
(C.9)
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where
∂2e∗C(θz)
∂α2z
=
c
′′′
(c
′′
)2
(θ¯ − θ)b
∂e∗C(θz)
∂αz
≤ 0. (C.10)
Together with ∂Uz/∂αz > 0 as αz → αˆ and Uz → αˆuC(θ) + (1 − αˆ)[π − uI(θ¯, eC)]
as αz → 1, the generalized program maxαz Uz has a unique solution over αz ∈ (αˆ, 1].
If ∂Uz/∂αz < 0 as αz → 1, then the optimal α
∗
z ∈ (αˆ, 1); and if ∂Uz/∂αz ≥ 0 as
αz → 1, then we have a corner solution and the challenger should fully settle with the
opportunistic inventor. In the former case, as αz → 1, the first-order condition,
∂Uz
∂αz
∣∣∣∣
αz→1
= θ¯π
∂e∗C(θz)
∂αz
∣∣∣∣
αz→1
+ αˆ
[
θ¯πeC − uC(θ)− θ¯π
∂e∗C(θz)
∂αz
∣∣∣∣
αz→1
+ (θ¯ − θ)be∗C(θz)
]
,
(C.11)
becomes strictly negative for αˆ small enough, i.e., we must have an interior solution.
Suppose that αˆ is so small that the optimal α∗z ∈ (αˆ, 1). Considering a small
increase in the patent quality αˆ′ > αˆ, we show that the same α∗z remains optimal when
αˆ′ is close enough to αˆ. Let αˆ′ be close enough to αˆ so that α∗z ∈ (αˆ
′, 1). We want to
show that ∀α′ ∈ (αˆ′, 1) and α′ 6= α∗z, with θ
′ = α′θ + (1− α′)θ¯,
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))−
αˆ′
α∗z
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
]
>π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))−
αˆ′
α′
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
]
,
(C.12)
⇒uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z)) > αˆ
′
{
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
α∗z
−
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
α′
}
.
(C.13)
By the definition and uniqueness of α∗z, since α
′ is also available under αˆ (for (αˆ′, 1) ⊂
(αˆ, 1)),
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))−
αˆ
α∗z
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
]
>π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))−
αˆ
α′
[
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
] (C.14)
⇒uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z)) > αˆ
{
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
α∗z
−
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
α′
}
.
(C.15)
Therefore, if α′ < α∗z, then eC(θ
′) > eC(θ
∗
z) and so uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′)) < uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z)), any
αˆ′ > αˆ will fulfill our objective. The same is true if α′ > α∗z but
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
α∗z
≤
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
α′
. (C.16)
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On the other hand, if α′ > α∗z and
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
∗
z))− uC(θ
∗
z)
α∗z
>
π − uI(θ¯, e
∗
C(θ
′))− uC(θ
′)
α′
, (C.17)
a αˆ′ close enough to αˆ guarantees the optimality of α∗z under αˆ
′. Q.E.D.
 Continuous types: Let the inventor keep the bargaining power but have con-
tinuous types θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let ex ante (before the examination process begins) CDF be
F (·) and pdf be f(·), with f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Again denote θ0 ≡
∫
1
0
θdF as the
ex ante expectation value of θ. A higher θ0 implies a lower quality.
When all types of inventors file patent applications, under the post-grant challenge
system and patent office efforts eP , the probability to eliminate the application is∫
1
0
θePdF = θ
0eP . Upon issuance, the distribution of θ is updated to
Fˆ (θ) ≡
1
1− θ0eP
∫ θ
0
(1− θ′eP )dF and fˆ(θ) ≡
1− θeP
1− θ0eP
f(θ); (C.18)
and the post-issuance expectation is
θˆ ≡
∫
1
0
θdFˆ =
θ0 − ePE(θ
2)
1− eP θ0
. (C.19)
Intuitively, stronger public enforcement reduces θˆ:
∂θˆ
∂eP
=
(θ0)2 − E(θ2)
(1− eP θ0)2
≤ 0, (C.20)
by Jensen’s inequality and the fact that x2 is a convex function.
To facilitate the presentation, let us define the following terms: given θ˜ ∈ (0, 1),
θˆ+ ≡ E(θ|θ ≥ θ˜, eP ) =
1
1− Fˆ (θ˜)
∫
1
θ˜
θdFˆ , (C.21)
and
θ+ ≡ E(θ|θ ≥ θ˜, eP = 0) =
1
1− F (θ˜)
∫
1
θ˜
θdF. (C.22)
θˆ+ is the post-issuance expectation, conditional on θ greater than a threshold θ˜; and
θ+ is the conditional mean at the ex ante stage, or, equivalently, when eP = 0. By the
same token, we define θˆ− and θ− as the conditional expectations when θ ≤ θ˜:
θˆ− ≡ E(θ|θ ≤ θ˜, eP ) =
1
Fˆ (θ˜)
∫ θ˜
0
θdFˆ , (C.23)
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and
θ− ≡ E(θ|θ ≤ θ˜, eP = 0) =
1
F (θ˜)
∫ θ˜
0
θdF. (C.24)
Maintain the assumption that the challenger’s litigation effort eC cannot be part of
the settlement agreement. Denote again uC(E(θ|L)) as the challenger’s expected payoff
when challenging a patent with expected “case quality” E(θ|L). When bargaining
breaks down, the optimal litigation effort e∗C also depends on E(θ|L): the first-order
condition E(θ|L)b ≡ c′(e∗C). Given e
∗
C , a patentee with of type θ has a expected payoff
from litigation (1−θe∗C)π. Since θ = 0 is always one of the possible types, f(0) > 0, and
cannot be eliminated by the patent office, under asymmetric information full settlement
cannot be a bargaining outcome. As long as Pr(θ > 0) > 0, the challenger will not
accept an agreement under which the inventor keeps the whole monopoly profit π.
For simplicity, consider only pure strategies. The following proposition, in resem-
blance of Lemma 1, shows that a settled patent dispute involves weak patents, i.e.,
those with high values of θ.
Proposition 8. (Case selection under continuous types). Suppose that both private play-
ers use pure strategies. Whether the inventor or the challenger makes the settlement
offer, there exists θ˜ ∈ (0, 1] such that a patent-holder litigates when having types θ
′
< θ˜,
and settles when having types θ
′′
> θ˜.
Proof. Since only pure strategies are allowed, there is only one equilibrium settlement
payment s (from the inventor to the challenger). Without loss of generality, let s =
0 if no agreement is ever reached. A bargaining outcome consists of two elements:
the equilibrium settlement offer s and the challenger’s litigation effort e∗C in case of
bargaining breakdown. The inventor’s payoffs from settlement and litigation are π− s
and (1 − θe∗C)π, respectively. The cut-off rule follows from the fact that the former is
constant while the latter is decreasing in θ. Q.E.D.
By this proposition, the challenger’s equilibrium litigation effort is determined in
accordance with the expectation E(θ|L) = θˆ−. Let θ¯I be the equilibrium cutoffs. We
first derive a sufficient condition under which partial settlement can be supported by
PBEs; then consider the impact of a marginal change in eP and the possibility of a
positive relationship between public and private enforcement.
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Proposition 9. (Bargaining equilibrium with continuous types). Consider continuous
types and let the inventor make the settlement offer. If uC(1) < e
∗
C(θˆ)π, there is no
PBE where all types of inventor litigate.
Any θ¯I ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium cutoff of a PBE if it satisfies
θ¯Ie
∗
C(θˆ
−)π ≥ uC(θˆ
+) ≡ max
eC
θˆ+eCb− c(eC). (C.25)
A sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium cutoff θ¯I ∈ (0, 1) is
e∗C
(
θ0 −E(θ2)
1− θ0
)
π > uC(1) = e¯Cb− c(e¯C ), (C.26)
where e¯C = e
∗
C(1) ≤ 1 is the maximal possible litigation effort, and E(θ
2) is evaluated
at the ex ante distribution.
Proof. Firs, consider full litigation as the equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium lit-
igation effort is e∗C(θˆ), and equilibrium payoff for a patent-holder with type θ is
[1 − θe∗C(θˆ)]π, decreasing in θ. To support this equilibrium, the challenger should
reject any positive settlement offer with appropriate off-path beliefs. However, since
the challenger will always agree to settle when offered a payment uC(1) (or plus a small
amount in order to break the tie), the patentee with types close to θ = 1 will find it
profitable to deviate and settle when π − uC(1) > [1− e
∗
C(θˆ)]π.
Now, suppose that θ¯I ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium cutoff, i.e., all θ
′ < θ¯I litigate while
all θ
′′
> θ¯I settle. Let θˆ
− and θˆ+ be the conditional means corresponding to θ¯I .
The type θ¯I must be indifferent between litigation (with a payoff [1− θ¯Ie
∗
C(θˆ
−)]π)
and settlement (with a payoff π−s), otherwise she and adjacent types will move toward
the more profitable strategy and upset the equilibrium. The equilibrium settlement
payment is s = θ¯Ie
∗
C(θˆ
−)π. But this offer has to be no smaller than the challenger’s
expected payoff from litigating against θˆ+ in order to accept the offer. Thus deter-
mines condition (C.25). This equilibrium can be supported by the challenger’s off-path
responses to accept any deviant offers greater than θ¯Ie
∗
C(θˆ
−)π, and reject smaller de-
viant offers while litigate with efforts at least as strong as the equilibrium litigation
level e∗C(θˆ
−).
For existence, note that as θ¯I → 1, θˆ
− → θˆ and θˆ+ → 1. The right-hand side
of condition (C.25) is simply the challenger’s maximal possible payoff from litigation:
maxθ uC(θ) = uC(1) = e¯Cb − c(e¯C). The left-hand side, as θ¯I → 1, approaches to
e∗C(θˆ)π, where θˆ is decreasing in eP . To guarantee the existence for all eP , condition
(C.26) establishes the existence when eP → 1. Q.E.D.
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Given an equilibrium cutoff θ¯I ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium settlement payment and
litigation efforts are θ¯Ie
∗
C(θˆ
−)π and e∗C(θˆ
−), respectively.
Remark. (Equilibrium refinement). As in a typical signaling game, multiple equilibria
may ensue.35 The intuitive criterion has no bites here.36 And, different from the
two-type case, a more stringent criterion such as D1 will eliminate all the PBEs with
positive probability of settlement. This is because, for all deviant offers s′ 6= s, those
types θ
′′
> θ¯I will be eliminated under D1 by the type θ¯I : With the same equilibrium
payoff but lower probability to be invalidated for all eC > 0, whenever a type θ
′′
weakly prefers to deviate and offer s′, the type θ¯I must strictly prefer to do so. But
this implies that the highest possible off-path belief is θ¯I , which busts the equilibrium
since the challenger has no reasonable off-path belief to reject a deviant offer s′ between
uC(θ¯I) and uC(θˆ
+). 
We now proceed to consider the impact of public enforcement eP . By θˆ decreasing
in eP , a higher eP makes it easier to sustain an equilibrium with no settlement. This
corresponds to the “full exposure” regime in the two-type case, and requires that the
worst type θ = 1 be willing to mix with all other types and fact an litigation effort
e∗C(θˆ) rather than offering uC(1) to guarantee settlement. This would happen when eP
is high and so e∗C(θˆ) is low enough.
Now, consider the effect of a marginal change in eP . An increasing in eP changes
the distribution function Fˆ at the private bargaining stage: ∀θ < 1,
∂Fˆ (θ)
∂eP
=
θ0 − E(θ′|θ′ ≤ θ)
(1− θ0eP )2
F (θ) > 0. (C.28)
A higher public enforcement effort shifts the distribution toward low values of θ. Pre-
sumably, this change may simultaneously move the equilibrium cutoff θ¯I and effort
35Indeed, when π >> b such that
π
[
e∗C(θˆ
−) + θ¯I
∂e∗
C
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θˆ−
∂θˆ−
∂θ¯I
]
> be∗C(θˆ
+)
∂θˆ+
∂θ¯I
, (C.27)
for any θ¯I satisfies condition (C.25), so does any θ > θ¯I .
36A PBE here can be supported by off-path strategies such that the challenger accepts any deviant
payment s′ higher than s, and rejects any smaller payment while exerting litigation efforts no smaller than
e∗
C
. Both responses can be justified by a belief that this offer comes from an inventor with an average type
θˆ+. Note that for s′ < s, no type of inventor can be eliminated by the intuitive criterion: Relative to their
equilibrium payoffs, the challenger’s acceptance of s′ is strictly preferred by those θ
′′
> θ¯, and the rejection
with a litigation effort higher than e∗
C
is strictly preferred by θ′ ≤ θ¯I . For the same reason, when s′ > s, the
intuitive criterion won’t be able to eliminate a type θ′ ≤ θ¯I . So even if some types θ
′′
> θ¯I can be deleted,
a belief that a deviant offer comes from those types smaller than θ¯I , with the resulting average quality θˆ
−,
suffices to support the challenger’s response.
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e∗C , with the latter both affected by the distribution and the equilibrium cutoff. For
simplicity, we restrict attention to a particular type of equilibrium adjustment. Similar
to the partial exposure regime under the two-type case, we consider when an increase
in eP will raise θ¯I but keep e
∗
C unchanged. If this holds, then a higher public effort en-
larges the set of inventor types under private scrutiny without compromising challenge
efforts.
We consider a pair of change deP and dθ¯I that keeps θˆ
− unchanged, and so the
equilibrium effort e∗C unchanged, and test when this pair of changes still satisfies con-
dition (C.25). Formally, define Λ ≡ θ¯Ie
∗
Cπ − uC(θˆ
+). In a PBE, Λ ≥ 0. We consider
(deP , dθ¯I) such that
∂Λ
∂eP
deP +
∂Λ
∂θ¯I
dθ¯I ≥ 0 s.t.
∂θˆ−
∂eP
deP +
∂θˆ−
∂θ¯I
dθ¯I = 0. (C.29)
Proposition 10. (Public and private enforcement under continuous types). In the
continuous-type setting where the inventor makes the offer, a higher eP makes it more
likely to have all types of inventor involved in litigation. Full exposure occurs under
high public enforcement.
In a PBE with equilibrium cutoff θ¯I ∈ (0, 1), a pair (deP , dθ¯I) satisfies condition
(C.29) if
∂θˆ−/∂eP
∂θˆ−/∂θ¯I
≥
∂θˆ+/∂eP
∂θˆ+/∂θ¯I
. (C.30)
Under ex ante uniform distribution F (θ) = θ, condition (C.30) is satisfied when θ¯I is
small enough.
Proof. Since θˆ− and so the equilibrium litigation effort e∗C are not affected by the
changes of eP and θ¯I , and by definition, uC(θˆ
+) = θˆ+e∗C(θˆ
+)b− c(e∗C(θˆ
+)), we have
∂Λ
∂eP
= −e∗C(θˆ
+)b
∂θˆ+
∂eP
and
∂Λ
∂θ¯I
= e∗C(θˆ
−)π − e∗C(θˆ
+)b
∂θˆ+
∂θ¯I
. (C.31)
By inserting the condition that keeps θˆ− intact,
dθ¯I = −
∂θˆ−/∂eP
∂θˆ−/∂θ¯I
deP , (C.32)
and after a few algebraic manipulations, we get
∂Λ
∂eP
deP +
∂Λ
∂θ¯I
dθ¯I =
deP
∂θˆ−/∂θ¯I
[
− e∗C(θˆ
−)π
∂θˆ−
∂eP
+ e∗C(θˆ
+)b
(∂θˆ+
∂θ¯I
∂θˆ−
∂eP
−
∂θˆ+
∂eP
∂θˆ−
∂θ¯I
)]
.
(C.33)
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Since ∂θˆ
−
∂θ¯I
> 0 > ∂θˆ
−
∂eP
(and so dθ¯I and deP should have the same sign), the whole term
is guaranteed to be positive if
∂θˆ+
∂θ¯I
∂θˆ−
∂eP
−
∂θˆ+
∂eP
∂θˆ−
∂θ¯I
≥ 0, (C.34)
or, equivalently, if condition (C.30) holds.
With ex ante uniform distribution, F (θ) = θ, post-issuance CDF and pdf are,
respectively,
Fˆ (θ) =
1
1− θ0eP
∫ θ
0
(1− θ′eP )dθ
′ =
θ(2− θeP )
2− eP
and fˆ(θ) =
2− 2θeP
2− eP
. (C.35)
Given a cutoff θ¯I , the conditional expectations are
θˆ+ =
2
2− (1 + θ¯I)eP
[1
2
(1 + θ¯I)−
eP
3
(1 + θ¯I + θ¯
2
I)
]
and θˆ− =
2θ¯I
2− θ¯IeP
(
1
2
−
eP
3
θ¯I).
(C.36)
Therefore,
∂θˆ+
∂θ¯I
=
2(1− θ¯IeP )[2(1 − eP ) + (1− θ¯IeP )]
3[2− (1 + θ¯I)eP ]2
, (C.37)
∂θˆ+
∂eP
= −
(1− θ¯I)
2
3[2− (1 + θ¯I)eP ]2
, (C.38)
∂θˆ−
∂eP
= −
θ¯2I
3(2− θ¯IeP )2
, (C.39)
∂θˆ−
∂θ¯I
=
2(3− θ¯IeP )(1− θ¯IeP )
3(2 − θ¯IeP )2
, (C.40)
and condition (C.30) requires:
∂θˆ−/∂eP
∂θˆ−/∂θ¯I
= −
θ¯2I
2(3− θ¯IeP )(1 − θ¯IeP )
≥
∂θˆ+/∂eP
∂θˆ+/∂θ¯I
= −
(1− θ¯I)
2
2(1− θ¯IeP )[2(1 − eP ) + (1− θ¯IeP )]
,
(C.41)
⇒(
1− θ¯I
θ¯I
)2 ≥
3− θ¯IeP − 2eP
3− θ¯IeP
. (C.42)
θ¯I has to be small enough. For instance, it is satisfied for all θ¯I ≤
1
2
. Q.E.D.
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